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Abstract:  
This paper contextualizes China’s contemporary global cultural footprints by examining the 
recent development of its cultural diplomacy. It started with discussing the limitations of 
applying ‘soft power’ as the mainstream analytical tool: its lack of historical perspective and 
engagement of the domestic dimension, as well as the incompatibility with the very purpose of 
cultural diplomacy with its binary view of cultures and values. Then an alternative and more 
sophisticated framework of analysis building on cultural hegemony, Orientalism and 
nationalism is proposed to look beyond and beneath the soft power narrative to reveal a 
three-dimensional picture against the historical, international and domestic contexts. The 
dynamics among all the forces at work in this terrain are also critically analyzed to illuminate 
the complex nature of this uneven global cultural terrain of struggle and the unique challenges 
faced by China’s cultural diplomacy.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
China’s expanding global presence goes hand in hand with its deeper engagement across 
cultural, economic, and diplomatic realms of international affairs. Amidst its growing influence, 
China has been trying to carve out a new identity in the global cultural terrain. The cultural 
diplomacy campaign was launched to fulfil this new mission. At the same time, when the China 
Dream of national rejuvenation is staged by President Xi Jinping, its push to regain the glory of 
Chinese culture has prompted both the Chinese society and China watchers to rethink China’s 
historical, ideological and cultural heritage.  
As the oldest continuous civilization on earth, China has survived 4000 years history with a 
rich cultural heritage, and re-emerged as the second largest economy in the world from 2010. 
However, since the perception of Chinese civilization in the rest of the world shifted from 
admiration in the 17th and 18th centuries to growing contempt in the 19th century, China’s image 
has been misrepresented in many Western countries since this negative downturn until today: 
from ‘yellow peril’ to ‘red threat’, the transformation brought by China’s modern development 
seems to have only changed the color code, from race to regime.  
If seen through theoretical lenses, we will be able to see two images of ‘otherness’ here. Firstly, 
the dichotomy of East and West as cultural entities was dissected by Said’s critique of 
Orientalism, in which the Orient is rendered as being the ‘inferior other’ for the Occident to 
define its own superior identity; in a way, an Orientalist perception of the world is ‘the West 
and the Rest’ (Hall, 1992, 185), with ‘the West’ at the center and ‘the Rest’ as the inferior. In 
history, although China had mostly been held as a civilized Confucian utopia until the 18th 
century, it became a rotten Oriental empire towards the end of the Qing Dynasty that had its 
cultural identity subject to ‘otherness’. 
Secondly, despite the shifting of the dynamic hub of the world economy, the traditional 
equation of the West with modernity and the Orient with the exotic past was carried onto 
modern times, when China’s authoritarian regime evolved its image from being ‘the cultural 
other’ to being ‘the ideological other’. As long as China maintains that the values of its political 
system are fundamentally different from the leading Western countries, China is still 
considered as the ‘other’ ideologically. Moreover, in the discourse of nationalism, China again 
fell into the camps of ‘us’ and ‘them’. These polarized ‘other’ representations upheld each other, 
and became dual forces of Western domination over China’s power of discourse when they 
came into play with the power and knowledge relations as defined by Foucault (1980). 
In response, the Chinese government believed launching a campaign of cultural diplomacy as a 
‘strategic communication’ would help it ‘get the right message to the right audience through the 
right medium at the right time (Anderson and Engstrom, 2009, 36). Chinese scholar Guo (2008, 
30) also argued for the right timing in that: 
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The international interest in, and recognition of, China’s role in the global 
economy and international politics appear to coincide with a Chinese 
government’s rethink of the image of China as a world power in tune with its 
reputation as an ancient civilization. 
This shows both an internal and external dimension: internally, China needs to construct a 
coherent view of its national identity at home that is commensurate with its people’s 
expectation to re-establish China as a major power and culture in today’s world; externally, 
China wishes to communicate with the world Confucius’s belief in ‘harmony with diversity’, 
not to fight for ‘hegemony with universal values’. Therefore, cultural diplomacy is expected to 
serve the dual aims of countering the China threat argument and advocating cultural pluralism 
at the same time, corresponding to the afore-mentioned two images of ‘otherness’.  
Academic interest in the study of China’s cultural diplomacy has only recently developed into a 
substantial body of research. However, its focus has almost been exclusively on how it is 
functioning as a tool to build China’s soft power. The aim of this paper was neither to measure 
the soft power generated by China’s cultural diplomacy, nor to argue whether or not it has been 
successful. Instead, its point of departure was to show the limitations of applying the 
Western-defined narrative of ‘soft power’ in non-Western contexts, and why an alternative and 
more sophisticated theoretical framework is needed to look both beyond and beneath the soft 
power lens to illuminate the complex nature of China’s cultural diplomacy.  
2. UNPACKING THE KEY CONCEPTS 
2.1 Cultural Diplomacy 
The hybrid term ‘cultural diplomacy’ does not have a particularly long history. It first appeared 
in the 1934 Oxford English Dictionary, as a laudatory reference for English language teaching 
abroad, but the concept did not gain much currency until the term ‘public diplomacy’ was 
coined by Edmund Gullion in 1965 during the days of the Cold War. It then appeared across a 
range of discourses, including academic, journalistic and governmental, to mean the ‘active, 
planned use of cultural, educational and informational programming to create a desired result 
that is directly related to a government’s foreign policy objectives’ (McClellan, 2004, n.p.).   
The above definition explains why cultural diplomacy was often considered as a core element 
of public diplomacy, or public diplomacy often assumes the form of cultural diplomacy, which 
is ‘the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspect of 
culture, with the intention of fostering mutual understanding’ [emphasis added] (Cummings, 
2009, n.p.). The definition given in the Cultural Diplomacy Dictionary echoes this: ‘the 
essential idea is to allow people access to different cultures and perspectives, and in this way, 
foster mutual understanding and dialogue’ (Kishore, 2013, n.p.). It was also made clear by the 
Institute for Cultural Diplomacy (2011, n.p.) that it ‘is not a promotion of its own culture, but 
rather of understanding and reconciling, as well as learning from each other’. 
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An important difference between ‘cultural difference’ and ‘cultural diversity’ was made by 
Bhabha (1994), who contended that the latter is static and concerns knowledge, while the 
former stress on the dynamic process and concerns interaction, during which an ‘Other’ culture 
was involved and a difference was produced between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’. Cultural pluralism 
thus addresses the process of mutual recognition, generation, and transformation in this 
interaction with other cultures, particularly between conflicting cultures, and reveals the 
tensions and exclusions involved in the process when the dominating culture tries to establish 
and maintain its authority. This distinguished ‘cultural pluralism’ from the simple fact of 
‘cultural diversity’: it is ‘a political response to the injustice done to members of formerly 
oppressed culture’ (Sabbagh, 2005, 100). 
From the above we can see cultural pluralism underpins the ultimate goal of cultural diplomacy. 
After clarifying this key concept of the research subject, the following section will look at the 
mainstream theory of using ‘soft power’ to explain the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy, 
followed by a critical review that exposes the inadequacy and even inappropriateness of 
applying it in examining China’s cultural diplomacy.  
2.2 Soft Power 
Coined by Joseph Nye in the late 1980s, the term ‘soft power’ means ‘the ability to get what 
you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment’ (Nye, 2004, x). The definition 
was expanded by adding the word ‘persuasion’ when he explained the new concept of ‘smart 
power’, a strategy that describes a successful ‘combination of the hard power of coercion and 
payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction’ (Nye, 2011, xiii). Again, in another 
article Nye published in 2012 about soft power in China, he referred to soft power as ‘the 
ability to get what one wants by attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment’ 
(Nye, 2012, n.p.). However, the inherent tension existing between the two, whereby ‘attraction’ 
draws on intrinsic values while ‘persuasion’ depends on extrinsic aids, was never discussed.  
According to Li (2009, 31), soft power in China is “primarily utilized to refute the ‘China 
Threat’ thesis, facilitate a better understanding of China’s domestic social-economic reality, 
and persuade the outside world to accept and support China’s rise”. However, a question worth 
pondering is: will state-led persuasion campaign increase or decrease the attraction of a 
country’s culture, political values and foreign policy, the three sources of soft power defined by 
Nye? Nye’s answer to this question was quite blunt in that Beijing is ‘trying its hands at 
attraction, and failing – miserably’, with the explanation being that China ‘made the mistake of 
thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power’ (Nye, 2013, n.p.). Yet, 
ironically, despite the academic and foreign policy debates it has induced at home in the US, 
the concept of ‘soft power’ was probably more enthusiastically embraced by the Chinese 
government than anywhere else, even to the extent of obsession according to Shambaugh (2013) 
and Tao (2015). It has gained considerable currency in both official and scholarly discourse in 
China, particularly after 2007 when it was adopted into the official lexicon: Chinese president 
Hu Jintao made it clear at the 17th National Congress that ‘cultural soft power’ has become ‘a 
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factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength’ (Hu, 2007, n.p.), 
and ‘building cultural soft power’ was listed on the agenda in the 12th Five-Year-Plan 
(2011-2015). After Xi Jinping took over in 2012, he not only continued to endorse this concept, 
but linked it with the new vision of the China Dream in a speech: ‘enhancing national cultural 
soft power is crucial to the realization of the two ‘centennial goals’ and the China Dream of 
national rejuvenation’ (Xi, 2013, n.p.). 
Possibly because of its frequent appearance in official rhetoric, there was not much scholarly 
debate on the concept’s relevance to China but extensive elaborations on its importance for 
China, almost as a timely cure found for China’s image problem that the government is facing 
following China’s economic and military rise. Therefore, of the myriad literature about China’s 
cultural diplomacy, the great majority has attributed its purpose to ‘building soft power’: it was 
expected to be the lubricant to transform China’s rise from a hard rise to a soft rise.  
True, if affluence were to lead to influence, the hard power of economic and military might 
need to be combined with cultural and values attraction to make the influence positive. Nye 
(2004, 2005, 2012, 2013, 2015) likes to quote changing positions in the opinion polls as an 
indicator of how successful one’s soft power strategy is, which encourages a common view of 
seeing soft power as a ‘competition between great powers’ (Guo, 2004, 20). Although Nye 
(2013, n.p.) himself claimed that ‘soft power need not be a zero-sum game’, the way he pitched 
China’s soft power growth in 2005 as ‘at America’s expense’ actually says it is. Nye and 
Wang’s research (2009, 21) also found that ‘most of these (American) views assume a 
zero-sum game perspective and cast a more negative rather than positive light on China’s soft 
power growth’. When China’s ranking slipped down across a number of international polls 
including Pew Global Attitude Survey (PGAS) after 2011,1 Nye (2011b) commented on the 
enormous gap between Chinese political values and the Western prevailing norms as one of the 
intrinsic reasons.  
If we remember the purpose of cultural diplomacy as ‘fostering mutual understanding’, we can 
see why this defies the validity of ‘soft power’ as being the underpinning theory for cultural 
diplomacy that clearly does not aim at one side winning over the other but focusing on a notion 
of a plus sum game. The soft power approach is still a binary one in essence and projects 
different cultural and value systems as representing identities that are rivals to each other. As 
the two separate sources of ‘soft power’ identified in Nye’s definition, ‘culture’ and ‘political 
values’ are becoming increasingly overlapping today, to the effect that the blurred boundary 
between the two has complicated conceptualizations of Chinese soft power and become a 
potential barrier for the focus of China’s cultural diplomacy on cultural promotion, which tends 
to be interpreted as steeped in political value promotion. By the same token, alongside the 
                                                             
1 Pew Global Attitude Survey was carried out by Pew Research Centre; available at: 
http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2012/06/Pew-Global-Attitudes-U.S.-Image-Report-FINAL-June-13-2012.pdf. 42. 
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political value divide between China and most Western countries, the cultural dimension was 
considered an extra layer of China’s non-Western identity. 
Also, since the concept of ‘soft power’ is affixed vis-a-vis China’s rising hard power, which is 
already causing great concerns internationally, this approach tends to picture China’s cultural 
diplomacy as a softening agent of the China Threat. It may be useful in analyzing the gap 
between the soft and hard powers of China and exploring why China’s soft power growth does 
not synchronize with its increases in hard economic rise as many scholars (Huntington, 1998; 
Lai and Lu, 2012) have argued for, but it is too narrow a lens through which to both view the 
purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy and to evaluate its effects, as it tends to apply the same 
lens to look at China as the U.S. and fails to recognize the unequal power positions associated 
with culture and ideology. Rather, the difference it shows is China’s drive is stronger in the soft 
power competition to match its recent rise in hard power, thus receiving more attention and 
funding from the central government.  
What is more important is that the ‘soft power’ lens has only put China in the limelight as the 
projecting side that launches a ‘charm offensive’ (Kurlantzick, 2007), while detaching it from 
the background of the global cultural terrain: it has not engaged with any historical analysis of 
the legacies of cultural hegemony, knowledge-power nexus and Orientalism have shaped 
national imaginaries and political discourses while underpinning the foundation of the current 
global cultural terrain. Nor did it address nationalism as the domestic driving force for China to 
launch cultural diplomacy to communicate its fresh self-perception, which is also connected to 
and regenerated from its own deep-seated historical past. The remnants of the historical 
contexts, both internationally and domestically, continued to permeate life in China today. If 
the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy is only examined from the perspectives of ‘building 
soft power’, it has only scratched the surface. 
After clarifying the definition of cultural diplomacy and analyzing the inadequacy of the 
current theoretical framework of soft power, the next section will proceed to present an 
overview of the historical, international and domestic contexts specifically for China, where the 
legacies of Orientalism, cultural hegemony, power-knowledge nexus and nationalism were 
interwoven into the complex global cultural terrain that China’s cultural diplomacy was 
launched into.  
3. THE HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS: CULTURAL 
HEGEMONY POWER RELATIONS AND ORIENTALISM  
This section will look at the historical dimension in the international contexts, which is 
underpinned by Gramsci’s concept of ‘cultural hegemony’, Foucault’s notion of ‘power 
relations’ and Said’s critique of ‘Orientalism’. What follows is an overview of these key 
concepts.   
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A good place to start with is the concept of culture hegemony, which was first formally put 
forward by Antonio Gramsci in the 1930s as ‘intellectual and moral leadership whose principal 
constituting elements are consent and persuasion’ (cited in Fontana, 1993,140). Gramsci 
contrasted the functions of ‘domination’ (direct physical coercion) with those of ‘direction’ 
(consent) in defining hegemony as ‘a complete fusion of economic, political, intellectual and 
moral objectives which will be brought about through the intermediary of ideology’ (cited in 
Mouffe, 1979, 181). This process of ‘manufacturing consent’ was further elaborated by 
Foucault (1980), who pointed out incisively that discourse is created and perpetuated by those 
who have the power and means of communication, and power is constituted through accepted 
forms of knowledge, which are reinforced and redefined constantly through the education 
system, the media, and the flux of political and economic ideologies. They have both 
highlighted the role played by ideology in producing and maintaining hegemony and power, as 
‘that part of culture which is actively concerned with the establishment and defence of patterns 
of belief and value’ (Fallers, 1961, 677). These two terms of ‘establishment’ and ‘defense’ 
captured the essence in this process: it aims at creating something new to cope with the cultural 
threats posed by the ‘other’, but it is also a defense of ‘our’ culture.  
Gramsci was visionary enough to take the conventional Marxist theory beyond class struggle to 
the fight for cultural hegemony as a more significant battle, while Foucault’s elaboration of 
power relations revealed how this battle is constant and pervasive in nature, and how power 
functions - the means by which it controls knowledge and vice versa. His research frame 
suggests analysis to be enmeshed in complex dynamics among truth, knowledge and power 
(Rowan and Shore, 2009). 
It is based on Gramsci’s concept of ‘cultural hegemony’ and Foucault’s theory of ‘knowledge 
is power’ that Said developed his critique of Orientalism by arguing from a different dichotomy 
of Occident and Orient, which is not about knowledge but about power: Said (1978, 3) 
dislocated the ‘familiar’ concept of the Orient to expose how the Other helps define the West 
via contrasting languages, experiences and images in a ‘Western style for dominating, 
restructuring, and having authority over the Orient’. He established that power and knowledge 
are inseparable components of the intellectual binary relationship with which Occidentals claim 
‘knowledge of the Orient’. Just as Dabashi (2015, 15) pinpointed, ‘the critique of Orientalism 
was a critique of a mode of knowledge production’. It exposed how the relationship between 
the “East and West’ as potentially cultural contestants was transform into ‘West and the Rest’: 
the study of the Orient by the Occident is not to achieve a truthful knowledge and perception, 
but to establish the West’s cultural hegemony over the East, under Western domination, the 
East has lost its power of discourse to the West. This was best summarized by the famous quote 
of Karl Marx in the first page of Orientalism: ‘they cannot represent themselves, they must be 
represented’.. 
Today, Orientalism is still one of the most powerful analytical concepts as the globalization of 
the Western culture constantly reaffirms the West’s view of itself as the center of legitimate 
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knowledge and the source of ‘civilized knowledge’. A word of explanation must be entered 
here regarding the East and West as ‘binary oppositions’, which makes them appear unified and 
homogeneous, essentially with one view about the other. Of course, this is not the case, both 
the East and West are terms covering enormous historical, cultural and economic distinctions; 
they are used as ‘short-hand’ generalizations here to make a point of the dialectic relationship. 
Hall (1992, 186) has remarkably deconstructed the concept of ‘the West’ as ‘a historical, not a 
geographical construct’; it is ‘a tool to think with’, ‘an ideology’, ‘a system of representation’, 
and a means by which such a non-generalizable identity is imagined as ‘a standard or model of 
comparison’ in a system of global power relations.   
Said further claimed that Western representations of the ‘Orient’ amounted to a form of cultural 
imperialism. One meaning of the term is that representations which claim to be objective and 
universal, in fact are the products of undisclosed relations of power. Huntington (1998,184) 
elaborated this in one sentence: ‘What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest’. In 
contrast to Huntington’s view that cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of 
conflicts in the post-Cold War international system, Said has continuously challenged the 
notion that difference implies hostility, and called for a new way of conceiving the conflicts 
that have stimulated generations of hostility, war, and imperial control. However, in his 2003 
Preface to the new print of Orientalism, Said (2003, xviii) still lamented that we were 
imprisoned in ‘labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity 
rather than understanding and intellectual exchange’. 
Apart from this label of being the inferior Orient, China also found itself haunted by another 
antiquated view as a representation of the ‘yellow peril’, a psychological fear that was projected 
mainly on East Asia. In modern days, the rise of a Communist China has activated this 
embedded fear when the new term ‘red threat’ resonated the continued fear as a recurrent 
pattern. In Tchen & Yeats’s words (2014, 16), it ‘becomes part of the politics of a people. It 
becomes ideology and faith’. The evolution of China’s image from being the ‘yellow peril’ to 
‘red threat’ suggests a system of Othering. In a way, if we can argue for a de-Orientalized 
cultural China in the modern world, this new vision of ‘ideological otherness’ is to 
re-Orientalize China: the inheritance of being the ‘cultural other’ has revived itself into being 
the demonized ‘ideological other’. 
To a certain extent, Gramsci’s ‘cultural hegemony’, Foucault’s knowledge-power nexus, Said’s 
‘cultural imperialism’ and Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ have all partially explained the 
coercive use of cultural power in international relations. Culture has always been a weapon of 
the powerful, and cultural resistance is therefore an eternal theme. Cabral (1973) has pointed 
out that cultural resistance may take on new forms (political, economic, armed) in order to fully 
contest foreign domination, and Wallerstein (1991, 100) argues that ‘cultural resistance today is 
very often organized resistance – not spontaneous resistance, but planned resistance’. 
Thus, under this theoretical framework, cultural diplomacy can be considered as a new form of 
planned cultural resistance for emerging powers like China, which has been held as the cultural 
Cambridge Journal of China Studies 
85 
and ideological ‘other’ and put under the Western hegemonic influence despite the shifts in 
global economic relations. If taken from Said’s and Gramsci’s perspectives, the purpose of 
China’s cultural diplomacy would be counter-hegemonic, giving it an active defensive edge, 
completely different from the commonly accepted synonym of launching a ‘charm offensive’. 
Its mission is not just to wield soft power, but to shift the power relations underpinning those 
misperceptions, which have the ‘Us’ and ‘Other’ ideology embedded in cultural hegemony.  
After analyzing the historical legacies in the international context, we must simultaneously take 
note of the domestic context, which is an integral part in understanding the purpose of China’s 
cultural diplomacy, especially concerning the timing: why do it now? The Chinese government 
has always been a firm believer of Lenin’s famous statement that diplomacy is the extension of 
domestic affairs, and building soft power is indeed communicated a lot to domestic audiences 
to generate national identity, build national cohesion and safeguard regime legitimacy. But 
there is another domestic dimension that was inadequately addressed in the current literature 
related to China’s cultural diplomacy: the role played by nationalism. The subject of Chinese 
nationalism is not under-researched, but more in the sphere of national sovereignty, security 
and international relations, with its double-edged role in both driving and limiting China’s 
cultural diplomacy yet to be explored. 
4. THR HISTORICAL AND DOMESTIC CONTEZT: NATIONALISM AND 
NATIONAL IDENTITY  
The significance of looking at the domestic context has special bearings on understanding why 
cultural diplomacy is now considered a priority on the government agenda. In the last three 
decades, China went through unprecedented transformation in history both in terms of scale 
and speed – cultural, economic, social and political. When the astonishing developments are 
shaping up a new China, the old ideology underpinning the regime legitimacy is being shaken. 
As argued by Hroch (1985), nationalism becomes a substitute for factors of integration in a 
disintegrating society. Many scholars have argued that in today’s China, nationalism is 
considered to be one of the two pillars that the national coherence and regime legitimacy rest 
on alongside rapid economic growth. The perception of state-sponsored nationalism as a 
strategic means to popular legitimacy corresponded to the two categories of Chinese 
nationalism defined by He and Guo (2000): ‘state nationalism’ refers to any doctrine, ideology 
or discourse in which the Chinese party-sate strives to identify itself as the nation, while 
‘popular nationalism’ comes from below and represents unsystematic, popular national 
sentiments.  
The strength of nationalism derives above all from its ability to create a sense of identity. Hall 
(1991, 21) has pointed that identity is always a structured representation which has to go 
through the eye of the needle of the ‘other’ before it can construct itself, and ‘there is no 
identity that is without the dialogic relationship to the other’. This coincides with Ozirimli’s 
(2005) view that the discourse of nationalism divides the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’, and shows 
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a tendency to perceive the world in terms of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’. During the Cold War era, 
nationalist emotions were used to carry out an ideological war against the enemy camp, while 
China today has shifted out of the party’s ideological control, ‘counter hegemony’ remains the 
main theme and has infiltrated deeper down in today’s stronger China, where popular 
nationalism has taken root outside the state itself. Increasingly, identity and public memory are 
fused in popular culture where nationalism is not imposed by the state so much as it resonated 
with people’s feelings.  
These two categories of nationalism can be associated with the two fundamental attributes of 
nationalism argued by Guibernau (1996): its political character as an ideology, and its capacity 
to be a provider of identity for individuals conscious of forming a group based upon a common 
culture, past, project for the future and attachment to a concrete territory. Smith (1991, 91) 
shared this view in talking about nationalism as both a ‘style of politics’ and a ‘form of culture’, 
while Ozikirimli (2005) believes nationalism ultimately turns the language of national identity 
into a language of morality, and renders it the very horizon of a political discourse. These dual 
attributes of nationalism were sometimes referred to as ‘cultural nationalism’ and ‘political 
nationalism’ (Yoshino, 1992, 1), which combined in the creation of an ideology that serves to 
celebrate and emphasize the nation as the preeminent collective identity of a people.  
The above shows what gives nationalism its power is its ability to bring the cultural and the 
political attributes together. If we apply the lens of Orientalism and cultural hegemony in 
looking at these two attributes in relation to China, we can see the deeply and widely embedded 
pride in Chinese culture was turned into a strong desire to rise against Western domination, and 
the political character gives the government a sense of mission that goes beyond the cultural 
scope. As an ancient and continuous civilization, what gives unity to the Chinese nation is 
people’s deepest attachment to pre-existing characteristics, culture and traditions. Actually, the 
emotional investment of individuals in the elements of Chinese culture is a key factor exploited 
by nationalism, and is easily amplified in a country like China that is highly centralized and 
always seeks to unify people’s mind. To a considerable extent, China’s ancient historical 
grandeur and the deep scar inflicted in its modern history is ingrained in China’s national 
psyche. This drive to regain glory and dignity, the deeply held and long-standing aspirations for 
restoring China’s position as a great power in the world is behind the new ambition of 
‘realizing the dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ proposed by Xi Jinping. 
He and Guo (2000, 2) have concluded that ‘the core goal of Chinese nationalism is not only to 
promote and protect the national interests of China, but also to restore its ‘greatness’, or to 
reassert China’s role in international politics’. In this sense, cultural diplomacy in China 
naturally converges state nationalism with popular nationalism, which is passionate about 
achieving an international status commensurate with Chinese people’s conception of their 
country’s rightful place in the world. However, Nye (2015) has explicitly claimed Chinese 
nationalism to be a negative energy, or ‘No. 1 factor limiting China’s soft power’, why is that? 
Because the dual characters of nationalism could often render culturally sustained boundaries 
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and identities the subject of political conflicts, leaving the government between a rock and a 
hard place, as the nationalistic discourse involves a strong sense of morality and can be volatile 
in nature: while it can strengthen the legitimacy of a regime by mustering people together, give 
unity to the nation by joining the disintegrating fractions of the right and the left, as well as 
polarized social classes of the rich and the poor; but on the other hand, it can also become a 
spear that the populace aims at leaders who are perceived to be weak in the face of external 
challenges, making the government wary of the rise of popular nationalist zeal might influence 
China’s image and other nations’ perception about its rising. Shambaugh (2013, 58) has 
observed more assertive Chinese nationalism emerging out of the current domestic discourse on 
China’s global identities, while Zhao (2013, 544) also commented on the delicate change in 
such domestic voices among the state media in ‘a dangerously stunted version of a free press, in 
which a Chinese commentator may more safely criticize government policy from a hawkish, 
nationalist direction than from a moderate, internationalist one.’ This means that however 
moderate or pragmatic the government seeks to be in its diplomacy, there are powerful 
domestic forces and voices that call for a more muscular foreign policy: 
Seeking status, acceptance and respect on the world stage, popular nationalists 
routinely charged the communist state as neither confident enough or competent 
enough in safeguarding China’s vital national interests and too chummy with 
Japan and soft in dealing with the United States (Zhao, 2013, 540).  
It appears that the more prominent of China’s rise on the world stage, the more salient is the 
double-edged nature of Chinese nationalism. The recent incidents such as the anti-US protests 
in May 1999, anti-Japanese protests that erupted across China in September 2012, and popular 
reactions to China’s territorial disputes with its Asian neighbors in 2015 have raised particular 
concerns about enhanced Chinese capabilities will produce new goals to act upon old 
grievances, and its growing presence in the world economy and its ever prominent role on the 
world political stage has begun to ‘feed Chinese pride, and potentially invites thoughts of Great 
Power muscle flexing’ (Unger, 1996, xii). This shows the tight rope between international and 
domestic contexts: while nationalism is filling the vacuum of ideology domestically, it is also 
fueling the China threat argument internationally at the same time. If China’s non-Western 
ideology is the breeding ground for the China threat perception, rising nationalism at home is 
like an undercurrent that supplies water to its life. 
Despite the rich literature regarding nationalism in China, very few have linked it to China’s 
undertaking of cultural diplomacy. I argue that at least in China’s case, we have to fully 
acknowledge the interplay between the two: on the one hand, nationalism as one of the major 
sources of identity formation gives driving force for China to launch cultural diplomacy: the 
desire to elevate China’s cultural position and counter cultural hegemony informs the 
party-state’s decision making, while the popular nationalism gives the state moral support and 
Volume 12, No. 4 
88 
even a sense of urgency to pursue cultural diplomacy; on the other hand, cultural diplomacy 
can play a dual role in balancing the ‘double-edged’ nature of Chinese nationalism: when an 
observable change in its external dimension is showing an increasingly zero-sum approach in 
China’s foreign policy, cultural diplomacy can help rein it in with its plus-sum approach; and 
when its internal dimension was criticized to ‘represent a backward-looking ideology, keeping 
an eye on the past and obsessed with China’s historical and cultural superiority’ (Lei, 2005, 
495), cultural diplomacy can change this ‘backward-looking’ ideology into a ‘forward-looking 
strategy, and draw on the cultural confidence produced by the stronger domestic development 
to turn China from inward-looking to outward-looking.  
At the same time, from the inherent attributes of nationalism and the interactions between state 
and popular nationalism in China, we can see the tight rope between international and domestic 
contexts. Therefore, viewing China’s cultural diplomacy through only one lens, be it domestic 
or international, misses the critical ways in which it actually works and will only lead to 
misinterpret or mischaracterize it. The best cultural diplomacy strategy must seek a balance 
between internal and external forces: both have historical legacies deeply ingrained, making it 
absolutely essential to be aware of the complex nature of China’s cultural diplomacy. 
Understanding a subject of a complex nature requires a complex approach. If the purpose of 
China’s cultural diplomacy is only examined from the perspectives of ‘building soft power’ and 
forming a positive national image, it has only scratched the surface. Therefore, a central 
contention of this thesis is that the soft power approach is insufficient, or even to the extent of 
inappropriate, to understanding China’s cultural diplomacy as it neglected crucial processes 
through which hegemony has been produced and maintained. A three-dimensional analytical 
framework constructed on historical, international and domestic dimensions, and drawing on 
the tripartite theories of Orientalism, cultural hegemony, and nationalism (see diagram 1 below) 
is needed to offer a more comprehensive perspective to investigate the prominent features of 
China’s cultural diplomacy. At the core of this complex is power, which lies at the interface of 
this new analytical framework. As Foucault (1982) pointed out, every relationship between 
forces is a power relation, thus all the arrows in the diagram below represents a power 
relationship. 
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Diagram 1. An alternative three-dimensional theoretical framework                                                
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Cultural diplomacy is an endeavor spanning over different nations, territories, races, 
development stages, social and political systems and cultural traditions, in many cases, it is also 
over different civilizations in Huntington’s terms. Due to these variances, and the constantly 
evolving power relationships, it is a very complex subject. While inspired and stimulated by the 
growing literature about China’s cultural diplomacy, this paper challenged the existing 
framework of analysis in this research area and argued the necessity to look through multiple 
lenses of the historical, international and domestic contexts in which China is endeavoring to 
reshape its image. It has re-conceptualized China’s cultural position in the world from the 
pre-modern period to contemporary times, and developed new lines of academic inquiry by 
critically reviewing the mainstream arguments and arguing for a more sophisticated analytical 
framework.  
The ‘soft power’ concept is incompatible with the very purpose of cultural diplomacy and lacks 
a historical perspective in locating the ‘root cause’ of the unique challenges faced by China, 
which is a complication co-produced by vestiges of Orientalism, Western cultural hegemony 
and the power-knowledge nexus; it also fails to show a holistic view of the global cultural 
terrain where China’s cultural diplomacy is launched into. Specifically, this paper has argued 
the following three limitations of using soft power as the analytical tool for China’s cultural 
diplomacy. 
China’s 
Cultural  
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First of all, by comparison with the definition of cultural diplomacy, we can see ‘soft power’ 
concept is not a good match with the fundamental vision of cultural diplomacy, which is a plus 
sum game of nurturing mutual understanding and mutual respect between cultures, it is the 
means to achieve the ends of building cultural pluralism, which echoes the ultimate goals of 
China’s cultural diplomacy. The ‘soft power’ concept still adopts a binary view of political 
cultures being incompatible with each other, thus tends to interpret cultural diplomacy as a 
zero-sum game to win hearts and minds. Besides, the two separate sources of ‘soft power’ and 
the two means of using them identified in Nye’s definition have complicated the 
conceptualization of China’s cultural diplomacy: its focus on showing the ‘attraction’ of its 
‘culture’ tends to be interpreted as steeped in ‘political value’ promotion through ‘persuasion’.  
Secondly, the concept of ‘soft power’ is inadequate because it applied the same lens to look at 
China as other Western countries and failed to recognize the unequal power positions associated 
with culture and ideology, as it has not engaged with any historical analysis of the legacies of 
cultural hegemony, knowledge-power nexus and Orientalism, which formed the interwoven 
foundation of the current global cultural terrain.  
Thirdly, it did not address the domestic context where nationalism is a driving force for China 
to launch cultural diplomacy that converges state nationalism and popular nationalism. 
Therefore, it is not only inadequate but also inappropriate to use ‘soft power’ to explain and 
examine the purpose of China’s cultural diplomacy. 
An alternative framework of analysis was then proposed by using cultural hegemony, 
Orientalism and nationalism to look both beyond and beneath the old perspectives. It has found 
that both culture and ideology helped draw the line between the two sides of hegemony and 
counter-hegemony in the global cultural terrain of struggle. Compared with the line of ‘cultural 
superiority and inferiority’ carved by Orientalism, more antagonist camps of ‘friends or 
enemies’ were created by anti-Communism, and China’s attempt at gaining more power of 
discourse was accused of ‘ideological infiltration’ by the hegemonic side. These new 
frameworks revealed a three-dimensional picture of an uneven global cultural terrain with 
hidden barriers for the counter-hegemonic side. Only by capturing the intricacies between the 
intertwined multiple contexts can we begin to acquire a deeper and more precise understanding 
of China’s cultural diplomacy.                                            
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